Identical Constitutional Language: What is a State Court to Do? \u3ci\u3eThe Ohio Case of State v. Robinette\u3c/i\u3e by Bettman, Marianna Brown
Akron Law Review 
Volume 32 Issue 4 Article 1 
1999 
Identical Constitutional Language: What is a State Court to Do? 
The Ohio Case of State v. Robinette 
Marianna Brown Bettman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will 
be important as we plan further development of our repository. 
Recommended Citation 
Bettman, Marianna Brown (1999) "Identical Constitutional Language: What is a State Court to Do? 
The Ohio Case of State v. Robinette," Akron Law Review: Vol. 32 : Iss. 4 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol32/iss4/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at 
IdeaExchange@UAkron, the institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please contact mjon@uakron.edu, 
uapress@uakron.edu. 
IDENTICAL CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE:
WHAT IS A STATE COURT TO Do?
THE OHIO CASE OF STATE V. ROBINETTE
by
Marianna Brown Bettman*
We are in the era of rediscovery of state constitutional law. In Ohio, there has been
an official announcement of this in the syllabus of a highly significant case, Arnold v.
City of Cleveland.' In Ohio, the syllabus is the law of the case. The syllabus of Arnold
begins with the simple but dramatic statement, '"The Ohio Constitution is a document
of independent force."2 It goes on to state, in the remainder of the paragraph, the basic
guidepost of federal/state relations in the area of individual rights:
In the areas of individual rights and civil liberties, the United States Constitution,
where applicable to the states, provides a floor below which state court decisions may
not fall. As long as state courts provide at least as much protection as the United
States Supreme Court has provided in its interpretation of the federal Bill of Rights,
state courts are unrestricted in according greater civil liberties and protections to
individuals and groups.3
This article will analyze the application of these principles in the case of State v.
Robinette ("Robinette I").4
The case of Robert Robinette, as often happens in cases which later become
significant precedents, had the most ordinary of beginnings. Robinette was stopped for
speeding on an interstate highway near Dayton, Ohio. While driving in a construction
zone with a posted speed limit of 45 mile per hour, he was clocked driving 69 miles per
hour. Sheriffs Deputy Roger Newsome was stopping speeders at this location for
safety reasons. He later testified that he stopped Robinette only to give him a warning,
and that he had no other suspicions of criminal activity afoot.
According to the state court of appeals decision,
[b]efore Newsome gave Robinette a warning, he went back to his cruiser and activated
a video camera. He had Robinette stand in front of the cruiser. Immediately after
giving Robinette a warning, with no pause or break in the conversation, Newsome
'Judge, First Appellate District of Ohio, February 1993-February 1999.
616 N.E.2d 163 (Ohio 1993).
Id. at 164.
3 1d.
4 653 N.E.2d 695 (Ohio 1995), rev'd, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) (hereinafter Robinette 1).
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asked Robinette if he was carrying any kind of contraband, including drugs, and
Robinette said that he was not. Then Newsome asked for and received permission to
search Robinette's car. 5
The search of Robinette' s car turned up a small amount of marijuana and one pill of
MDMA (known as "Ecstasy"). Robinette was arrested and charged with drug abuse,
namely, knowing possession of a controlled substance. Robinette moved to suppress
the evidence on the grounds of an illegal search. The motion to suppress was denied,
and he was found guilty following a no-contest plea.
On appeal, Robinette argued that the motion to suppress should have been granted
because once the purpose for the investigative stop was over, the officer could no
longer lawfully detain him for further investigation.6 The state argued that once the
purpose of the investigative stop was over, Robinette was free to go, and that his
consent to search was both voluntary and valid.7 In a 2-1 decision, the appellate court
agreed with Robinette that his motion to suppress should have been granted, and it
reversed the trial court's decision.8
On August 31, 1994, the Ohio Supreme Court agreed to review the case.9 It is
noteworthy that in the appellate court decision there was no discussion of state or
federal constitutional law.
The issue, as framed by Justice Pfeiffer, for a 4-3 majority of the Ohio Supreme
Court, was "whether the evidence used against Robinette was obtained through a valid
search."10 Concluding that the search was not valid because it was the product of an
unlawful detention, the court went on to articulate a bright-line test requiring the police,
after a valid detention is completed, to tell citizens they are free to go before attempting
any consensual interrogation. The body of the majority opinion then ends with this
statement: 'The Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution and Section 14, Article
I of the Ohio Constitution exist to protect citizens against such an unreasonable
interference with their liberty."'"





9 State v. Robinette, 638 N.E.2d 88 (Ohio 1994).
1o Robineue I, 653 N.E.2d at 697.
" Id. at 699.
658 [Vol. 32:4
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WHAT IS A STATE COURT TO Do?
As stated above, in Ohio, the syllabus is the law of the case, a fact of some
significance in the later review of Robinette. The two-paragraph syllabus of Robinette
I holds:
1. When the motivation behind a police officer's continued detention of a person
stopped for a traffic violation is not related to the purpose of the original,
constitutional stop, and when that continued detention is not based on any articulable
facts giving rise to a suspicion of some separate illegal activity justifying an extension
of the detention, the continued detention constitutes an illegal seizure.
2. The right, guaranteed by the federal and Ohio Constitutions, to be secure in one's
person and property requires that citizens stopped for traffic offenses be clearly
informed by the detaining officer when they are free to go after a valid detention,
before an officer attempts to engage in a consensual interrogation. Any attempt at
consensual interrogation must be preceded by the phrase "At this time you legally are
free to go" or by words of similar import (emphasis added). 12
Of significance to this article is the stated reliance in the second paragraph of the
syllabus on both the federal and the state constitutions. Despite this statement of dual
reliance in the syllabus, all the constitutional analysis in the majority opinion is based
on federal precedent. There is only one state supreme court case even cited by the
majority, State v. Chatton,13 and that case explicitly grounds its decision in the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Similarly, the dissent, expressing disturbance at the bright-line test, states that the
majority's test "is contrary to well-established state and federal constitutional law."' 4
As in the majority opinion, there is no state constitutional citation or analysis. The only
state case cited by the dissent, State v. Childress,"5 also relies only on federal precedent.
There is a single footnote in the dissenting opinion, which states "Section 14, Article I
of the Ohio Constitution is analogous to the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution."16
12 Id. at 696. In her separate concurrence in Ohio v. Robinette, Justice Ginsburg refers to
this as the "first-tell-then-ask-rule." Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 41 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
' 463 N.E.2d 1237 (Ohio 1984).
14 Robinette I, 653 N.E.2d at 699 (Sweeney, J., dissenting).
15 488 N.E.2d 155 (Ohio 1983).
16 Robinette I, 653 N.E.2d at 699 n.1 (Sweeney, J., dissenting). Section 14, Article I of
the Ohio Constitution reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
possessions, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and
1999]
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A brief discussion on how the United States Supreme Court reviews state court
decisions is in order. The court of last resort in the state court system, which in Ohio
is the Ohio Supreme Court, is the final word on the interpretation of state law.
However, when state courts interpret federal law, the United States Supreme Court has
the power to review these decisions. Thus, it was of great interest when, on March 4,
1996, the United States Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in the Robinette"
case, grounded as it was, as stated in the syllabus, in both the state and the federal
constitutions. In fact, the oral argument of Robinette began with counsel for Robinette
suggesting that the writ was improvidently granted, and that the case should be
dismissed, because it was decided on adequate and independent state grounds, which
were not reviewable by the high court.18 But is merely saying that there are adequate
and independent state grounds enough to defeat federal high court review?
In Michigan v. Long, 9 the high court rejected "dual reliance" as a way of defeating
federal review. According to Michigan v. Long, in the absence of a "plain statement"
of adequate and independent state grounds, federal jurisdiction to hear the matter is to
be presumed. Under this view, to avoid federal review, state courts must make clear
that federal precedents are used only for "guidance, and do not themselves compel the
result that the [state] court has reached." 20
At oral argument in Ohio v. Robinette ("Robinette lp')2 1, Justice O'Connor
responded to defense counsel's suggestion of dismissal by pointing out that Ohio has
generally followed the federal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in search-and-
no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched and the person and things to be
seized.
OHO CONST. of 1851, art. I, § 14. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
17516 U.S. 1157 (1996).
1 Search and Seizure; Consensual Interrogation After Traffic Stop, 65 U.S.L.W.
3320, 3322 (1996).
19 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).20 Id. at 1041.
21 519 U.S. 33 (1996) (hereinafter Robinette I).
[Vol. 32:4
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seizure cases. She commented that only when a state court has rejected federal law and
adopted something different as a matter of state law would the rule of Michigan v.
Long come into play.22 This colloquy was picked up again in the separate concurrence
of Justice Ginsburg in the decision in Robinette 1J.23
The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by six of the
justices, began by noting that the Court first had to consider whether it had jurisdiction
to review the decision at all.24 The Chief Justice's opinion gave short shrift to the
"independent state grounds"25 alleged. While acknowledging that in Ohio the syllabus
is the law of the case, the Court found the statement in the syllabus that the opinion was
based on both the federal and the Ohio Constitutions too general to determine the
jurisdictional question. The Court declared it was thus free to turn to the body of the
opinion to determine the grounds for the decision, citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co.26 In doing so, the Court was especially struck by the fact that the
opinion relied entirely on federal law, including the one state case cited. The Court
reaffirmed the rule of Michigan v. Long, which it declined to change, that when the
decision appears to rest primarily on federal law, and when there is no adequate or
independent ground clear from the opinion, the Court will assume the decision is based
on federal precedent and review it accordingly. In short, boldly saying that a case is
decided on an independent state ground will not necessarily make it so.
Turning then to the merits, the Court rejected both the analysis in the first paragraph
of the syllabus, citing Whren v. United States27 (decided after the state court decision in
Robinette I and holding that the subjective intentions of a police officer do not make
continued detention illegal, so long as detention is justified by the circumstances as
viewed objectively), and also the bright-line test in the second paragraph, citing
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte28 (voluntariness of consent to search is a question of fact to
22 Search and Seizure: Consensual Interrogation After traffic Stop, supra note 18, at
3322.
23519 U.S. at 41-44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
24ld. at 36-37. Interestingly, the sole question asked in the state's petition for certiorari was
"[w]hether the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires police officers
to inform motorists, lawfully stopped for traffic violations, that the legal detention has
concluded before any subsequent interrogation or search will be found to be consensual?" State
v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695 (Ohio 1995), cert. granted, 516 U.S. 1157 (1996).
2 Robinette 11, 519 U.S. at 37-38.
26 433 U.S. 562, 565-566 (1977).
27 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
28 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
[Vol. 32:4
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be determined from all the circumstances). The Ohio Supreme Court's judgment was
reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
Justice Ginsburg concurred in judgment, but she wrote separately because she
thought the Ohio Supreme Court "may not have homed in on the implication ordinarily
to be drawn from a state court's reliance on the Federal Constitution."29 Justice
Ginsburg noted that the majority's reversal of the first-tell-then-ask rle articulated in
the second paragraph of the syllabus of Robinette I was not a per se rejection of such a
rule but was only a rejection pursuant to federal precedent: such a rule might otherwise
be perfectly acceptable in Ohio if there really were independent state constitutional
grounds for it. She agreed with the majority that both the syllabus and the opinion of
the Ohio Supreme Court in Robinette I were ambiguous in their stated basis of review,
and her concurrence went on to provide a virtual primer on federalism.
While noting that ambiguity will trigger the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisdiction, she
wrote the following:
It is incumbent on a state court, therefore, when it determines that its State's laws call
for protection more complete than the Federal Constitution demands, to be clear about
its ultimate reliance on state law. Similarly, a state court announcing a new legal rule
arguably derived from both federal and state law can definitively render state law an
adequate and independent ground for its decision by a simple declaration to that
effect.
30
Justice Ginsburg even went so far as to provide an example of the proper
articulation of an independent state ground, using a Montana Supreme Court decision
on the scope of an individual's privilege against self-incrimination:
While we have devoted considerable time to a lengthy discussion of the application of
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, it is to be noted that this
holding is also based separately and independently on the [defendant's] right to remain
silent pursuant to Article 1H, Section 25 of the Montana Constitution.
31
The choice of the Montana case by Justice Ginsburg is a particularly interesting one.
While the Supreme Court of Montana emphatically stated in its conclusion that the
29 Robinette II, 519 U.S. at 42-43 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
30 Id. at 44.
31 Id. (quoting Montana v. Fuller, 915 P.2d 809, 816 (1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
301 (1996) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 32:4
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holding was firmly grounded in the state constitution, its rationale, much like Robinette
I, was based almost exclusively on federal precedent. Further, just as the search-and-
seizure language in the Ohio Constitution is virtually identical to its federal counterpart,
so too is the Montana constitutional prohibition against self-incrimination virtually the
same as the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In this era of "new" states'
rights, the challenge for the states will be how to satisfy the "independent state ground"
requirement of Michigan v. Long, where the language of state and federal constitutional
provisions is identical, and the state does not yet have a body of state precedent on
which to draw.
On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Ohio Supreme Court (with one
change in the court's membership, potentially significant in that the first Robinette case
was a 4-3 decision, with one of the members of the majority retiring before the
rehearing) first declined to re-examine its earlier decision on independent state
constitutional grounds. While acknowledging the basic principle that the "new
federalism" permits state courts to provide greater protection for individual rights under
their state constitutions than is required under federal constitutional standards, a
majority of the court held that the protections under the Fourth Amendment and
Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution were the same, apparently because the
language is "virtually identical." State v. Robinette ("Robinette Ir').32 In reaching this
conclusion, the court relied principally on two of its own earlier decisions,33 Nicholas
v. Cleveland34 and State v. Geraldo
3 5
Having declined to base the decision in Robinette III on independent state grounds,
the court went on to re-analyze the voluntariness of Robinette's consent to search his
car. First, in regard to the lawfulness of the continued detention of Robinette after the
original purpose of the investigative stop was completed, the court modified the first
paragraph of the syllabus of Robinette I to conform to Whren v. United States. 36 The
officer's subjective motivation for the continued detention was replaced with an
objective-justification test. Second, because of the finding that the protections of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14, Article I of the
Ohio Constitution were coextensive, the bright-line "first-tell-then-ask rule" of the
second syllabus paragraph of Robinette I was abandoned. Instead, the court specifically
32 685 N.E.2d 762, 766-767 (Ohio 1997) (hereinafter Robinette III); see supra note 2.
33 Robinette, 685 N.E.2d at 767.
34 182 N.E. 26 (Ohio 1932).
3 429 N.E.2d 141 (Ohio 1981).
36 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (decided after Robinette I).
[Vol. 32:4
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adopted the totality-of-the-circumstances test set forth in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,37
as the controlling test under Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution to determine
whether permission to search a car is voluntary. Finally, the third paragraph of the
syllabus of Robinette III states:
Once an individual has been unlawfully detained by law enforcement, for his or her
consent to be considered an independent act of free will, the totality of the
circumstances must clearly demonstrate that a reasonable person would believe that he
or she had the freedom to refuse to answer further questions and could in fact leave.
(Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), followed.)3 8
On the facts presented, the court applied the totality-of-the-circumstances test.
The court was influenced by the fact that after the officer told Robinette he was
letting him off with a verbal warning, without any break in the conversation, the
officer asked for consent to search the car. Robinette testified that he answered
"yes" automatically, because he did not feel that he could refuse the officer or that
he was any longer free to go. Finding that these circumstances made the
questioning impliedly coercive, the court repeated the following quotation from
Robinete I:
The transition between detention and a consensual exchange can be so seamless that
the untrained eye may not notice that it has occurred. The undetectability of that
transition may be used by police officers to coerce citizens into answering questions
that they need not answer, or to allow a search of a vehicle that they are not legally
obligated to allow.39
The court majority concluded that Robinette had merely submitted to a claim of
lawful authority, not voluntarily consented to the search of his car, and held
inadmissible the evidence seized from that search. One justice concurred in the
judgment only,' and two justices dissented4 1 on the grounds that they would find that
consent was voluntarily given under the totality-of-the circumstances test.
In conclusion, if Robinette began as an experiment in what Justice Ginsburg
describes as the states' unique "laboratories" to "explore different means to secure
3 412 U.S. 218 (1973).38Robinette Il1, 685 N.E.2d 762, 763 (Ohio 1997).
39 685 N.E.2d at 770-771 (quoting Robinette I, 653 N.E.2d 695, 698 (Ohio 1995)).
40 Id. at 772 (Cook, J., concurring).
41 Id. at 774 (Sweeney, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 32:4
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respect for individual rights in modem times" as per Arizona v. Evans,4 2 it ended
outside the laboratory by choosing, for the time being, to stay with federal precedent in
this area of the law of search and seizure.
42 514 U.S. 1, 30 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 32:4
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